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The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIIP) constitutes an attempt to improve 
job creation and boost the economies on both sides of the Atlantic. Yet economic benefits and 
standard setting impacts notwithstanding, policy makers and legislators assess trade and 
investment agreements by a different metric. Politics, not economics, will determine the fate of 
TTIP, and opponents appear to have made some inroads with the public. This paper looks at the 
influence of interest groups and public opinions on developments in TTIP. This initial study 
finds correlations between public interest group activity, public opinion, and changes in TTIP. 
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1. Introduction 
In 2013 the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) began negotiating the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). More expansive than normal trade 
agreements TTIP will include tariffs reductions or eliminations, but technical barriers to trade 
(TBT), or non-tariff barriers (NTBs), are the main focus of negotiations.
1
 Specifically, TTIP is 
aimed at narrowing or removing divergent standards across the Atlantic. TTIP’s encompassing 
agenda represents a strategic vision of significantly improved transatlantic relations, where 
‘Mutual recognition of equivalent norms and regulatory coherence across the transatlantic 
space….not only promise to improve the lives of [Americans and Europeans], but form the core 
of broader international norms and standards.’2 This means solidifying transatlantic ties amidst 
growing competition (read: threats) from China and other emerging countries by agreeing to 
common standards in the world’s two largest markets. The potentially significant economic gains 
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from an ambitious TTIP remain contested,
3
 even if the predicted effects from trade diversion are 
mostly positive.
4
   
Given the scope of the negotiating agenda, the size of the transatlantic relationship 
(€700bn in annual bilateral trade, 44 percent of global GDP, 32 percent of trade, and 60 percent 
of foreign investments worldwide in 2012), and the desire to mold and solidify international 
standards in tune with EU and US preferences TTIP will also have far reaching geopolitcal 
implications.
5
 The US and EU tend to seek trade agreements with the same countries and 
regions, often driven by realist pursuits of influence over these markets, even if normative 
preferences for human rights and development also feature prominently.
6
 Though there are 
significant similarities in policy objectives, recognized processes, and agreed standards, no two 
treaties signed by the EU and the US are identical.  
The size of the players and the length and scope of TTIP negotiations – affecting more 
sectors and industries than any previous agreement – has evoked attention among civil society 
groups. This paper constitutes a first attempt at addressing two questions: What role do domestic 
groups and public opinion play in TTIP? How is this influence or impact discernable? This paper 
is part of a larger outcome-oriented study to explain the influences on and developments in TTIP, 
and is intended as a contribution to the literature examining the role of interest groups and public 
opinion  as they contribute to our understanding of developments in and outcomes of complex 
and multifaceted bi-lateral negotiations. It is argued that public interest groups have a real impact 
of how TTIP negotiations are perceived by the public (i.e. voters), in turn constraining available 
options for public officials and negotiators attempting an agreement.  
The next section presents a summary of the debate and developments on SPS and GMO 
issues, and ISDS, in TTIP negotiations.  This is followed by a discussion of the theoretical 
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framework, which draws on theories pertaining to trade policy, interest group activities, and 
public opinion. The approach used draws on Dür and Mateo (2014), whose study on ACTA is 
deemed a good template for assessing interest group’s impact on TTIP. The next section applies 
the theoretical framework to help explain the influence achieved by civil society groups, 
primarily public interest groups, in shaping key issues in TTIP.  The conclusion summarizes the 
findings while bringing further attention to the political, rather than economic, nature of the 
debates shaping TTIP. 
2. Food and ISDS in TTIP: the issues and debate. 
Both the US and EU began negotiations seeking greater market access for dairy, poultry, 
and beef exports, while also desiring to eliminate tariffs. While agricultural and food products 
constitute a relatively small portion (4-5%) of transatlantic trade, tariff levels are higher on 
agricultural and food products than other sectors, averaging 9 % (US) and 14% (EU), with 
applied EU tariffs on dairy imports hovering above 50% and applied American beverage tariffs 
of 16%.
7
 Eliminating applied tariffs on most products was not expected to face resistance, but 
discussions on food products, processes, and standards were, in the words of one US negotiator, 
‘going to be very difficult.’ European exports to the US are led by processed foods and are ten 
times greater than imports of American goods. Yet with the impending abolishment of EU milk 
and sugar quotas European producers saw TTIP as a way of expanding market access for, 
including for  grade-A dairy, beef, and apples. The US went into negotiations seeking 
recognition of its SPS standards as equivalent to those in the EU, along with a reduction in 
technical barriers to trade (regulatory differences, product standards, procedures related to 
human and animal welfare).
8
 American officials have long reiterated they ‘do not want to force 
European consumers to eat food they reject; rather, we want Europe to follow the advice of its 
4 
 
own food safety authority and to give European consumers a choice, rather than to persistently 
ignore science-based decision making for political ends.’9  
As the negotiations were launched European environmental and consumer groups began 
campaigning against what they perceived as a threat to higher (safer) EU standards, while 
expressing great resistance to accepting American standards.
10
 Controversial issues related to 
food (sanitary processes, hormones, GMOs) soon joined ISDS at the top of the anti-TTIP 
campaign. Mutual recognition and recognized equivalence of processes do not require either side 
to actually alter laws or regulations, but they imply equal quality, and require public acceptance 
of the other’s standards. Several public interest groups argued that mutual recognition would lead 
to a race to the bottom as corporate interests were placated, and the convergence of standards 
across the Atlantic was touted as destroying achievements in the EU on food safety, health and 
nutrition.
11
 Groups began criticizing the potential recognition of American standards as ‘weak’ 
and ‘less safe’, reflected in position papers, social media posts, protests, and public statements, 
often picked up by the media.
12
 The European Consumer Organization explained 
It is not without reason that chlorinated chicken has emerged as a symbol of the 
detriments European consumers might face if a TTIP deal is signed that does not have 
consumers’ interests at heart. Chlorinated chicken has to do  first of all  with  consumer 
preferences : research conducted in the UK, Denmark and Finland  consistently found 
that European consumers’ acceptance of meat that has been  treated with chemicals is 
low.
13
 
The same document (p. 3) continues with  [t]he European approach to meat safety is 
more efficient in protecting public health,’ and that the American approach is ‘[t]he “easy fix” to 
make up for poor farming and slaughter hygiene.’ 
In a June 2014 open letter, which was either published or referenced by several news 
prominent European outlets, three leading civil society groups argued  
…fair, sustainable and safe food could permanently be damaged by the transatlantic trade 
deal on the table.’ The WTO SPS agreement has been disproportionately used by the US 
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(on behalf of agribusiness) to challenge EU standards on a wide range of food safety 
measure. We cannot have confidence that the draft measures designed to expedite 
agricultural and food trade between Europe and America will uphold to the highest 
standards the food safety safeguards that protect consumers and animals.
14
  
 
Polls kept showing declining support for TTIP, especially on food related issues, with a 
general public perception of the US as less regulated and more profit driven, resulting in lower 
safety standards.
15
 Commission assurances that no food standards would be lowered was been 
met with skepticism,  ‘we don’t ….not having access to the texts creates suspicion, we have to 
operate under the worst case scenario.’16 This was continuously repeated in press releases and 
social media posts.
17
   
Throughout 2014 and early 2015 the Commission continuously emphasized that TTIP 
negotiations are the most transparent ever undertaken and that no changes will be made to EU 
food standards; it even took the unprecedented step of releasing not only position papers but 
actual proposed texts for the SPS chapter in TTIP.
18
 The latter was quickly rebuked by civil 
society groups as ‘potentially harmful to EU citizens.’19  
The application of the precautionary principle as guiding EU food policy has featured 
prominently in the debate over TTIP, even if the perception that only the EU uses the 
precautionary principle is false; it depends on the sector, and overall there appears to be little 
difference in the number of areas guided by this principle.
20
 The European Food Safety Agency 
(EFSA) has deemed numerous currently banned processes and products safe; but all are awaiting 
political approval. Member States rejected a GM corn (MON810), which, like dozens of other 
GMOs, was deemed safe by EFSA.
21
 Another GMO, Maize 1507, still awaits Commission 
approval after 14 years, despite a European Court of Justice decision criticizing the approval 
process.
22
 The EU’s chief science adviser urged more evidence-based decisions, even asserting 
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that GMO opponents suffered from ‘a kind of madness,’ only to be forced out following political 
outcry over her views.
23
 Josling and Tangermann (2014, p. 22) found a major confusion in the 
EU public, which requires ‘...a distinction needs to be made between the approval of GM 
products for sale in the EU on the one hand and the question of licensing the planting of GM 
seed varieties in Europe.’ Parts of the EU market may be accessible after a 2015 EU GM 
Directive takes effect. This allows member states to decide, on very wide bases, which of the 
approved GMOs to allow domestically, even if a country banning a particular GMO cannot 
prohibit imports of products from other EU states allowing the use of the same GMO.
24
 This 
could also provide an opportunity for comprise in TTIP by enabling greater American seed 
imports to specific member countries. The directive was opposed by many civil society groups as 
insufficiently rigorous in safeguarding against unsafe GMOs.   
Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) systems are meant to ensure foreign investors 
have access to de-politicized legal redress for compensation (not legislative changes) when a 
host country’s government violates the terms of the treaty. The Europeans have longstanding 
experience with ISDS through Bilateral Investment Agreements (BiTs), which began in Europe 
after WWII as investors wanted assurances when investing in former colonies; EU states have 
signed 1,400 BITs, compared with the mere 48 signed by the US.
25
 
ISDS immediately became highly sensitive. In the fall of 2013 civil society groups staged 
protests and published policy papers opposing ISDS. Even after a pause in negotiations on ISDS 
was announced in January 2014, opposition continued unabated. Citizen groups held protests and 
panel discussions, created youbute videos, used facebook to generate support, wrote position 
papers, and issued press releases against ISDS,
26 saying it prevents policy flexibility and thwarts 
the principle of legitimate decision making by providing companies legal redress against 
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democratic decisions through suits in international tribunals.
27
 Throughout the year think tanks, 
universities, and law centers issued policy papers, legal briefs, and held panel debates.
28
 The US 
Congress in turn debated trade promotion authority legislation requiring ISDS in trade 
agreements. 
29
 
 Both the US and the EU continuously declared that ISDS does not impede governments’ 
legislative and regulatory independence, while allowing for legitimate investor claims when 
discriminated against based on nationality, denied due process, or company assets are 
expropriated without compensation.
30
 European companies said they would not have ventured 
deep into Eastern Europe if not for the protection offered by ISDS.
31 Many academic studies and 
policy papers recognized that most modern treaties explicitly guarantee states their right to 
regulate to protect health, the environment, and other areas in the public interest, while 
disagreeing on the usefulness of existing, and proposed modifications to, models of ISDS.
32
  
In July 2014 200 EU civil society groups presented more than one million European 
signatures to the EU Commission, petitioning it to alter its negotiations and hold hearings in 
Parliament.
33
 While rejected (because the petition process does not apply to preparatory 
decisions, only legal acts) it generated outcry from citizen groups and media coverage across 
Europe.
34
 The same group filed a lawsuit against the Commission in November 2014, which will 
likely serve the same purpose. Opposition to ISDS also worked its way into governments, with 
France and Germany expressing desires to see a renegotiation of the ISDS clause in the EU-
Canadian free trade agreement.
35 
Following the January 2015, release of the Commission’s 
public ‘consultation’, the Commission promised months of stakeholder dialogue and possible 
refinements to ISDS.
36
 The Commission’s position was met with indignation from civil society 
groups.
37
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2. Theory  
Modern trade agreements concern not only economic gains, but also standard setting and 
geopolitical considerations, meaning it is very political. Politics is about perceptions, and for 
agreements requiring legislative ratification constituency perceptions matter. Mansfield & Milner 
(2010, 2012) argue that although potential veto players may influence the content of an 
agreement (through concessions), regime type (democracy) is more important for successful 
FTAs. Mature democracies tend to have numerous formal (legal) and informal (politically 
sensitive) veto players, diverse electorates, and varying public perceptions of the concept and 
usefulness of free trade, and yet appear adapt at funneling, addressing and incorporating 
divergent views into successful agreements. Economically hard times also offer democratic 
leaders an opportunity to balance calls from business to open new markets with protectionist 
preferences among interest groups and the public, thus committing ‘to a lower level of 
protectionism than they might otherwise desire, and to signal voters that they will not allow trade 
policy to be dictated by special interests.’38 
Policy makers and trade negotiators on both sides of the Atlantic have also developed 
mechanisms for consultation with industry before and during negotiations, and major 
transatlantic business groups have created institutionalized processes for presenting proposals for 
regulatory reform and influencing trade agendas.
39
 Other research show support for a similar 
‘economic-elite domination’ theory, where elites shape opinion through think-tanks, media, and 
other outlets, thus generating a correlation between the preferences of economic elites and the 
mass public; this research also finds business groups’ preferences slightly negatively correlated 
with general public preferences.
40
  
Dür and Mateo (2014) question the elite driven perspective, and outline a reciprocal 
relationship between interest groups and public opinion and effects on policy outcome. Since 
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public opinion is ‘an important determinant of public policy’ they present a theoretical model of 
how interest groups both shape public opinion and transfer public opinion through to policy 
makers.
41
 The effectiveness of groups’ abilities to shape opinion ‘[i]s likely to depend on a 
combination of factors including the number, size, demands, and tactics of groups devoted to the 
same general end.’42  
Because the public has existing some preferences and prejudices on most issues, interest 
groups wishing to shape public opinion toward a certain stance must not only inform (educate) 
but also appeal to existing public beliefs or opinions, and build on or relate to these. Interest 
groups cannot counter existing opinion, and ‘[a]re generally constrained to making demands that 
are, or can be construed as, legitimate or within reason by the standards of the larger publics that 
will eventually learn of them.’ (Wilson 1995: 288). The expectation thus is for interest group 
lobbying to be most effective if it is consistent with public opinion.’43 The empirical question is 
then whether the public has an opinion on an issue, and whether it is explicit, strong or weak, or 
perhaps latent, ripe for evocation. If the latter, appealing to domestic cultural, values, and 
societal norms can serve to solidify opinions and influence trade policy.
44
 Human preference for 
consistency and simplicity over the complex reality means we often erect filters that stop 
information which is perceived inconsistent with and contradictory to what one expects based on 
preconceived notions and worldviews.
45
 This means campaigns to raise salience cannot 
contradict, and preferably tap into, some exiting beliefs and opinions. Such campaigns may 
include appealing to product or process associations, which in turn elicit a response. Thus, if 
chemicals (A) are associated with poison (B), associating a different product or issue (C) with A 
can elicit a negative response to C.
46
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What if the public is unaware of an issue, and thus lacks preferences? If people lack 
awareness of an issue it also lacks an opinion, making it easier for policy makers to ignore the 
public, while requiring interest groups passionate about the issue to educate the public.
47
 If an 
issue is not atop the public agenda interest groups must first make an issue salient in order to 
garner support and engage the public. Humans are more receptive to and accepting of fear than 
positive messaging, and later-in-time information remains more relevant than earlier 
information.
48
 The literature shows that the less knowledge one has the likelier it is that one 
changes opinions; logically this makes one more acceptant of both information and propaganda, 
and less able to distinguish between the two.
49
 Pew Research Center studies of public knowledge 
of American foreign affairs conducted in 1989 and 2007 are among the few studies what people 
know, rather than just what they think or believe. The surveys reveal very limited knowledge, 
and no significant improvement in 2007 compared with 198, despite significantly more access to 
news via new media.
50
 My own, limited, 2009 college freshmen survey on knowledge of Europe 
and European policies also showed poor results. Limited knowledge of foreign policy and 
economics may thus make the public more receptive to the negative messages promulgated by 
protectionist forces and opponents of change. Once salience is raised and supporters rallied, 
other groups also tend to mobilize for the cause in a ‘snowball effect’.51 
To further their cause public interest groups use ‘inside’ tactics such as letters to officials 
and personal meetings, but also ‘outside’ tactics, using their supporters or members to execute 
traditional lobbying campaigns, such as demonstrations and petitions,
52
 as well as modern 
versions such as social media postings and creative websites. If government responds when 
public opinion changes we have ‘dynamic agenda representation.’53   
Naturally businesses are also concerned with public opinion. But,  
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Business associations have firms as members and thus do not need to focus on issues 
that are highly publicly salient to attract members or supporters. Rather, many members 
of business associations, namely firms that sell consumer goods and services, may be 
reluctant to see their names associated with highly unpopular campaigns for fear of 
losing customers (or even becoming the target of a consumer boycott). High Public 
salience, then, may have the effect of deterring business lobbying, or at least shifting the 
burden of lobbying, from firms to business associations.
54
  
 
Examining how the Anti-Counterfeiting Agreement (ACTA) was defeated in the 
European Parliament, Dür and Mateo (2014) find that active outside lobbying by interest groups 
raised the salience of the issue in the general public, which in turn mobilized other interest 
groups, further galvanizing public opinion, which ‘has long been shown to influence public 
policy.’55 Governments ceased ratification in the face of public opposition, and the Parliament 
voted against the agreement. The defeat of ACTA also challenges the correlation between 
resources and policy change, supporting other research showing little evidence connects 
resources spent lobbying with specific policy change.
56
  
From policy makers’ perspectives public opinion and interest groups action are not 
always easy to either delineate or satisfy. Since policy outcome is not always a zero-sum game – 
more than one group’s preferences can be met if the preferences are positively correlated– one 
can perceive of policy makers attempting to anticipate people’s basic preferences (what they will 
accept beyond the immediate; the latent opinion) and values, and so aim for compromises to that 
end. Whether a chosen policy is acceptable is of course only discernable after its implementation.  
From the above overview we find that democracies seek out FTAs, often times to bolster 
economic growth. The Commission has some autonomy, with an a priori mandate, and strategy, 
but this does not prevent interest group influence. Public interest groups inform, appeal to and 
shape public opinion through a variety of means. Successful campaigns raise the salience of 
issues to the public, often by appealing to perceptions and connecting to culture and values, and 
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then aligning campaigns with some pre-existing belief, which is then strengthened and/or 
modified. The working hypotheses are a) that anti-TTIP interest group activity has increased 
European public opposition to TTIP; and b) that interest group campaigns and public opinion 
have shaped developments in key sectors of the negotiations. As noted, the purpose here is not a 
systematic test of hypotheses in order to support a generalizable theory. Rather, this is a first 
attempt at assessing the influence of European public interest groups by showing correlations 
between campaigns, public opinion, and developments in TTIP. 
 
4. Interest group activity, public opinion, culture 
How can we know if interest groups influenced peoples’ preferences on food and investor 
issues, or views on TTIP? Disaggregating sources of influence, such as media coverage and 
lobbying efforts, and showing direct causation is very difficult, but we find correlations between 
campaigns, shifting public opinion, and developments in TTIP.  
Public opinion surveys show a mixed message. Europe’s long and expansive history of 
trade agreements, generally favorable European public attitudes towards trade, strong support for 
scientific bases for decision making, should mean the default assumption would be a public in 
favor of TTIP; even in the depth of the financial crisis in 2010 65% of European said the EU 
benefitted from international trade.
57
 While general support for trade remains around 80%, 
support for TTIP across the EU remains stagnant, and support in some larger EU countries has 
fallen (Table 1). In April 2014 55% of Germans thought TTIP was ‘a good thing’, and while 
88% of Germans said trade was generally a good thing five months later, only 48% then 
supported TTIP, which fell to 39% in  by November.
58
 Austria exhibited the same decline. No 
correlation has been found between general support for trade and specific support for TTIP, 
indicating that anti-TTIP campaigns have had an impact on public opinion.
 59
 On related 
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questions in a separate survey, the percentage of British respondents who believed the 
government could protect the National Health Service in TTIP dropped 24 points from August 
2013 to August 2014; 39% thought TTIP would harm small business, and 54% did not trust the 
government the government to negotiate a deal in the best interest of Britain.
 60
 Leaving aside the 
obvious problem that the EU governments are not negotiating TTIP, the public sentiments are 
real; assurances that health services will not be privatized are increasingly dismissed, effecting 
support for TTIP.  
In order for people to care about food or investment rules as it pertains to trade, the issues 
must be made salient. One indication of the increased salience of an issue is the increased 
frequency it is searched on the internet. Using Goggle Trends and the search term TTIP there 
were not enough searches to show any volume in 2012 (Graphs 1 & 2). The following year 
Germany registered the most TTIP web searches, followed by Austria and Belgium, the three 
countries with the most civil society activity.  By 2014 all major EU countries and the US 
registered significant searches, led by Austria, followed by Germany, Belgium, Finland, UK, 
Spain and Sweden. Two of the peak periods surround the fifth and seventh rounds of TTIP, and 
late in 2014, when officials on both sides were talking of the need for a new start and the ISDS 
consultation report was initially expected. The peaks in searches in Germany and Austria 
correspond to where the liveliest debates on TTIP have taken place, and where some of the 
strongest and most active anti-TTIP groups are located. While assessing activity is difficult, there 
are proxies. The European Citizens Initiative claims 350 groups support its efforts to stop TTIP. 
While all signatories to the petition may not be active, the list provides one indication of 
involvement.
61
 Excluding the 31 pan-European organizations, the countries with most groups are 
Germany (114), European UK (25), and Austria and France (each 15). 
62
 Bauer (2015) finds that  
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85 per cent of all TTIP-related positions in German online media are originally authored 
and spread by anti-TTIP groups. Similarly, for the period July-December 2014, anti-TTIP 
groups’ announcements in Germany amounted to 83 per cent of total online media 
reporting on average, going up to 93 per cent in peak times. …around the TTIP 
negotiations rounds, and it is obvious that there are coordinated multi-online-media 
campaigns with high success rates.(cf. Table 3) 
 
Furthermore, of the 150,000 submissions to the EU’s ISDS consultation, 97% were 
collectively pre-formatted submissions from interest groups; over 96% from the United 
Kingdom, Austria, Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands and Spain.
63
  
Public interest groups’ policy papers and reports on key issues such as agriculture, public 
services, GMOs, or ISDS, aimed at core members of many civil society groups, have been 
written by people with immense technical and legal expertise.
64
 One can take issue with case 
selectivity and references (e.g. the infamous chlorine washes of chickens is routinely emphasized 
while omitting the permitted, but more diluted, chlorine washes for lettuce in the EU), and the 
interpretation of legal proposals or analyses are often peppered with potentialities (could, might, 
possibly etc),
65
 but public commentaries and presentations skillfully present ‘regulatory 
convergence’ as preventing future improvements to public safety by cementing current 
standards, while ‘regulatory compatibility’ and ‘common standards’ are interpreted as 
euphemisms for lowering labor, environmental, and consumer standards.
66
 This may be little 
different than EU officials and supportive policy makers creating ‘fictional expectations’ by 
touting the ‘best case scenario’ for jobs and economic growth from TTIP based on economic 
models frequently criticized by academics.
67
 The difference appears to be that the public believe 
civil society groups; polls suggest their strategy works. 
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Public interest groups appear to have successfully tapped into Europeans’ deeply rooted 
socio-cultural relationship with food, and thus food safety.
68
 For most Europeans the significance 
of food extends far beyond its nutritional value; it is an essential part of life; and thus caution 
prevails and acceptance of others’ standards raise concerns.69  While science and technology is 
widely supported as the basis for policy and progress in most areas, less than half of Europeans 
believe science can improve food (make it safer).
70
 Only 30% of Europeans expressed concerns 
about residues such as antibiotics or hormones in meat 2010 – before any talk of a trade 
agreement – but in 20014 there was great resistance to accepting American standards or altering 
what many Europeans believe are higher EU standards.
71
 The prevailing norm of objection to 
GMOs is deeply entrenched; the last Eurobarometer polls on GMOs, in 2010, showed only 21% 
thought they were safe.
72
 60% of European also check the origin of their food, and for nearly half 
the origin influences their purchase.
73
 This is higher than for any other category of products, 
indicating awareness of and concern with food, and likely higher receptivity to public interest 
campaigns regarding issues related to food.  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Table 1: Public Opinion on a Transatlatic Trade Agreement 
A Transatlatic Trade Agreement
will help our economy grow,
Spring 2013
A Transatlatic Agreement will
make our economy more
vulnerable
Support TTIP, Nov 2014
Against TTIP
Sources: Eurobarometer 11/2014, 
German Marshall Fund 2013 
Transatlantic Trends 
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During the preparations for TTIP by the HLWG an EU official acknowledged ‘We know 
we can’t harmonize certain food standards, we’ll never get that past [national] parliaments, 
people won’t go for it.’74 The official communication over the next two years changed little, with 
Commission officials continuously reiterating that standards will not change ‘There is no way 
our citizens accept certain US standards, even if almost the same, politicians know that.’75 Thus, 
even though a deep-seated relationship with food and support for EU food standards preceded 
TTIP, campaigns evoked and strengthened these sentiments. Appealing to the public about the 
possibility, however remote, of having to accept GMOs, chlorinated chicken and hormones 
appears to have been a well-chosen strategy to force officials to repeatedly and publicly 
guarantee that EU standards would not change. This has may have a substantial impact on the 
outcome of TTIP since ‘There will be no agreement [TTIP] without poultry [access], 
Congressional representatives have made that clear. There will be no ag-farm industry support.’76 
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Graph 1: Google Web Searches for TTIP 2012-2015* (Globally) 
(source: Google Trends)  
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  (*All graphs from Google Trends reflect the number of searches for a term relative to the total number of searches 
done on Google over time. They don't represent absolute search volume numbers, because the data is normalized 
and presented on a scale from 0-100. Each point on the graph is divided by the highest point and multiplied by 100.) 
 
Youtube on TTIP searches were none existent until 2013, but also peaked around mid-
October 2014 (Graph 3). Though volumes on different terms associated with TTIP were too low 
to register, anecdotally, my own searches in October and December 2014 on TTIP showed 16 
and 18 of the 20 first results respectively on youtube were anti-TTIP.  
 
 
As noted, media coverage itself can act to inform and shape public opinion, but not only 
did Google Trends peak around the time of increased activities such as ‘Anti-TTIP’ days and 
‘European Days of Action’ in the spring, summer and fall of 2014 (e.g. May 15, July 8, October 
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11 and 13, December 19, in Brussels, London, Birmingham, Berlin, and Amsterdam), stories in 
major global papers also rose as interest group activity increased.
 77
  
 
 
 
The fervor generated around a half-century old policy, which until 2013 remained an obscure 
feature of international law to all but industry experts and a fraction of academia, correlates with 
the commencement of TTIP negotiations and the conclusion of CETA. On the issue of ISDS 
civil society groups had to educate citizens on a process in place since the late 1950s. With little 
prior knowledge it was easier to shape opinion by stressing the negative cases and potential with 
ISDS. The Google Trends for ISDS show a similar pattern to TTIP, corresponding to periods of 
campaign activism. 
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Negotiations on ISDS were paused in early 2014 and a consultation announced. The 
results were expected in late 2014, but were finally released early 2015; spikes in searches are 
visible during those periods, while public support continuously declined, as noted above. As well 
as ensuring transparency on this particular issue in negotiations, the Commission sought to 
balance doing what is necessary to keep ISDS in the TTIP with what is presumed to reasonably 
satisfy people’s basic preferences. The promise of ‘continued dialogue’ with stakeholders and 
civil society groups was, as one Commission official admitted, an acknowledgement that civil 
society groups’ ‘push’ and ‘opposition’ and public sentiments have affected how they reviewed 
ISDS and how they decided to go forward with ISDS, including ‘the way we communicate this 
[ISDS].’78 However, while promising more consultation, it has not proposed or been required to 
remove ISDS from the agenda. Its communication in the press release was strategically worded 
to balance recognition of opposition with a determination to find a compromise ensuring ISDS is 
included in a final agreement.
79
  
Proponents of TTIP, such as industry representatives, have been very quiet; many 
unprepared for the strong anti-TTIP activism. A representative of a transatlantic business 
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organization acknowledged ‘[t]hey [industry] realize now that civil society groups now have an 
advantage in the marketing of TTIP and TTIP issues, and that businesses have difficulties in 
getting across their concerns and issues and businesses difficulty conveying the truth and  
countering misperceptions distributed by CSOs. There are intense discussions now on how to 
counter misperceptions and promote TTIP.’80 Industry leaders also became less sanguine about 
TTIP between 2013 and late 2014.
81
 These responses are similar to Dürand Mateo’s (2014) 
findings of firms’ reluctance to wade in against public opinion and counter interest groups’ 
campaigns (against ACTA) for fear of a bad public image.
82
 However, ACTA eventually became 
such a hot issue some business organizations felt forced to become active; as noted above, TTIP 
may well see more active business organizations in 2015-16. 
There are still other possible variables explaining growing opposition to TTIP. A major 
argument when launching TTIP was that it would improve economic growth and create jobs, and 
this has since been touted repeatedly by EU officials and business groups. Since unemployment 
and the economic situation remained the top concerns of European citizens in 2013 and 2014 
(Eurobaromter 80,82), with trade not figuring in either survey and a majority of Europeans 
believing trade fails to create jobs, one could expect citizens to be less receptive to anti-TTIP 
campaigns. Yet Eurobarometer surveys show a slight decline from April 2013 to September 
2014 in the percentage believing their country’s economic situation was ‘bad’ (73% to 68%). 
There has also has been declining trust in EU institutions and national governments since the 
financial crisis, so citizens may just be opposed to EU initiatives, including TTIP. 48% of EU 
citizens trusted the EU in 2009 but only 31% in 2013; 38% trusted national governments in 
2009, but only 25% in 2013. However, by spring 2014 the declining trend reversed, and by fall 
2014 trust in EU institutions  was up 6% points from a year earlier, to 37%, and 29% now trusted 
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their governments. In sum, the trends on people’s views of the economy and trust in the 
institutions negotiating TTIP thus reinforces the hypothesis of anti-TTIP campaigns influences. 
5. Conclusion 
Groups with limited resources have made effective use of selective data, simplifications, 
exaggerations, and distortions, especially in social media disseminations.  While the extent of 
influence requires further study, including extensive surveys of participants, correlations and 
admissions by participants indicate that civil society groups have both shaped public opinion and 
influenced the trajectory in TTIP.  
The Commission knew when launching TTIP that it needed a strong message; a holistic 
approach that was proactive and quickly reactive, uniting media relations, outreach and 
monitoring of public debate, targeted communications material deployed material through all 
channels, including online and social media.
83
 Focusing on KOREU, Siles-Brügge (2011) argues 
the Commission created a prevailing economic narrative on the imperative of trade liberalization 
as a ‘necessary response to external economic imperatives,’ in order to overcome sector-specific 
opposition and complete the agreement with modifications satisfactory to domestic interest 
groups. The conclusion pf ‘deep’ FTAs with Korea and Canada show the EU can accommodate 
business preferences and interest groups to sign beneficial agreements. However, TTIP has 
generated unprecedented attention, and the Commission’s communication has been largely 
unsuccessful in countering the perception that TTIP will benefit big business but not average 
citizens.
84
  
Upon leaving office in the fall of 2014 EU Trade Commissioner de Gucht acknowledged 
in would be a challenge even with the best of campaigns and messaging: ‘Trade has become 
much more political. You can only do this [TTIP] deal if there’s enough political steering and 
enough political will to do it,…Well, on both sides – on the American side but also on the 
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European side – that still has to be demonstrated.’85 In regards to the German debate he argued, 
‘I cannot convince the German public. It’s up to the German politicians; it’s up to Ms Merkel 
and Mr Gabriel to convince their population, that’s their task. I know she has been speaking out 
in favour, but she should make a political point of it, that there’s a clear position of the 
government on [the US deal].’86  
Politics, not macroeconomic data or models, will determine the fate of TTIP, and anti-
TTIP civil society interest groups thus far appear more successful in garnering support on key 
issues. As US Ambassador to the EU Gardner recognized ‘The deal will not collapse because of 
differences in standards or regulations, but rather from the perception that there is not enough 
upside for key constituencies.’87  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. 
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Table 4. Online Activity on TTIP in Germany (source: Bauer, 2015, at 
http://www.ecipe.org/blog/anti-ttip-german-online-media)  
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1
 This paper includes insight gained from several personal discussions with EU and US 
negotiators, stakeholders, and public officials in 2012 -2015. 
2
 Hamilton and Schwartz 2012:4; cf. Felbermayr et al 2013: 28 
3
 Numerous studies assessing the economic benefits of reduced or eliminated tariffs and NTBs, 
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